Literature on Collective Decision-Making in Organizations

 Textbooks

  • Hodge, J.K./Klima, R.E. : The Mathematics of Voting; American Mathematical Society, 2005.
  • Hargreaves Heap, S. et.al.: The Theory of Choice, Blackwell, Oxford, Cambridge/MA 1992.
  • Holt, C.A.: Markets, Games & Strategic Behavior; Pearson/Addison Wesley, Boston et.al. 2007.
  • Ordeshook, P., Game Theory and Political Theory, Cambridge Univ. Press 1986.
  • Taylor, A. D., Mathematics and politics: strategy, voting, power and proof, Springer, New York, 1995.
  • Williamson, O. (1985) The Economic Institutions Of Capitalism, The Free Press/Macmillan, New York and London.


Articles

  • Bernholz, P. (1973): Logrolling, Arrow Paradox, and Cyclical Majorities, Public Choice 15(1), 87-95.
  • Congleton, R. (2002): The Median Voter Model, in Rowley, R. K.; Schneider, F. (eds.) The Encyclopedia of Public Choice.
  • Coase, R.H. (1937): The Nature of the Firm, Economica NS 4 (16), 386-405.
  • Felsenthal, D. / Machover, M. (2004) : A Priori Voting Power: What Is It All About?, in: Political Studies Review, Volume 2, 1-23.
  • Garrett, G. / Tsebelis G. (1999): Why Resist the Temptation to Apply Power Indices to the European Union. Journal of Theoretical Politics 11(3), 291-308.
  • Garrett, G. / Tsebelis G. (1999): More Reasons to Resist the Temptation of Power Indices in the European Union. Journal of Theoretical Politics 11(3), 331-338.
  • Heiner, R.A. (1983): The Origin of Predictable Behavior, American Economic Review 73(4), 560-595.
  • Inderst, R./Müller, H./Wärneryd, K.(2005): Influence Cost and Hierarchy, Economics of Governance 6, 177-197.
  • Kirstein, R. (2006): The Condorcet Jury-Theorem with Two Independent Error-Probabilities, Center for the Study of Law and Economics Discussion Paper 2006-03, version (04) of April 2006.
  • Kirstein, R. (2010): Volkswagen vs. Porsche. A Power-Index Analysis. International Journal of Corporate Governance 2(1), 1-20.
  • Kirstein, R. /Cooter, R. (2007): Sharing and anti-sharing in teams, in: Economics Letters Volume 96, Issue 3, September 2007, Pages 351-356.
  • Kirstein, R./Schmidtchen, D. (2003): Self-interest, Social Wealth, and Competition as a Discovery Procedure. Center for the Study of Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 2003-08, Saarbrücken.
  • Kirstein, R. / Wangenheim, G.v. (2007).
  • Lane, J.-E. / Berg, S. (1999).: Relevance of Voting Power, Journal of Theoretical Politics 11(3), 309-320.
  • Leech, D. (2001): Shareholder Voting Power and Corporate Governance: A Study of Large British Companies, in: The Nordic Journal of Political Economy 27(1), 33-54.
  • Leech, D. (2002): Designing the Voting System for the Council of the European Union, Public Choice 113, 437-464.
  • Penrose, L.S. (1946), The Elementary Statistics of Majority Voting, in: Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 109(1)1946, 53-57.
  • Steunenberg B. et. al. (1999).: Strategic Power in the European Union, Evaluating the Distribution of Power in Policy Games, Journal of Theoretical Politics 11(3), 339-366.
  • Tullock, G. (1967): The General Irrelevance of the General Impossibility Theorem, Quarterly Journal of Economics 81(2), 256-270.


Further papers - and the information which papers are inevitable to read - will be announced in class.

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